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Rethinking Territory 
 
Abstract 
 
Territory is the quintessential state space and appears to be of growing political 
importance. It is also a key concept in geography, but it has not been subject to as 
much critical attention as related geographical terms and remains under-theorised. 
Taking my cue from Timothy Mitchell’s suggestion that the state should be 
understood as the effect of social practices, I argue that the phenomenon that we call 
territory is not an irreducible foundation of state power, let alone the expression of a 
biological imperative. Instead, territory too must be interpreted principally as an 
effect. This ‚territory-effect‛ can best be understood as the outcome of networked 
socio-technical practices. Thus far from refuting or falsifying network theories of 
spatiality, the current resurgence of territory can be seen as itself a product of 
relational networks. Drawing on an empirical case study of the monitoring of 
regional economic performance through the measurement of Gross Value Added 
(GVA), I show that ‚territory‛ and ‚network‛ are not, as is often assumed, 
incommensurable and rival principles of spatial organisation, but are intimately 
connected. 
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Introduction 
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Territory is back. For long something of a poor relation among spatial concepts, and 
until recently on the wane politically, territory today seems to be ever more 
important. Borders, security, sovereignty, secession, invasion and occupation – all 
usually seen as close correlates of territory – are rarely out of the news. Meanwhile, 
in political theory and philosophy, the fashionable notion of deterritorialisation 
cannot be separated from a correlative reterritorialisation. Territory’s time has come, 
or so it seems. 
 
If any kind of space is quintessentially ‚state space‛, it is surely ‚territory‛. Yet, for 
all the far-reaching discussion of the territorial reorganisation of the contemporary 
state, the decline and rise of the political salience of territory, and the implications of 
territory for the exercise of power, the nature of territory itself – its being and 
becoming, rather than its consequences and effects – remains under-theorised and 
too often taken for granted. The intense engagement with diverse forms of social 
theory that has marked human geography since the 1980s has involved a 
comprehensive interrogation and re-thinking of many of the core concepts of the 
discipline, including space, place, landscape, region and scale. Until recently, 
however, the concept of territory has not received the same level of attention, at least 
in the Anglophone literature. 
 
It is interesting to think about the reasons for this relative neglect. It seems plausible 
to suggest that among critical human geographers the concept of territory may even 
have been seen as something of an embarrassment. There is a couple of possible 
explanations for this, particularly if  we accept for the sake of argument that territory 
has usually been understood as a bounded and in some respects homogeneous portion 
of geographical space. Geographical thinking in the 1980s and 1990s came 
increasingly to emphasise the porosity and fluidity of boundaries, and the 
supposedly consequent reduction in their political salience. It also stressed the 
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increasingly (or even intrinsically) heterogeneous character of space and place. In 
these circumstances, invoking the concept of territory risked being seen as either 
anachronistic (because the world had changed) or reactionary (because an insistence 
on seeing the world in terms of bounded and homogenous spaces suggested a fear of 
Otherness and an exclusionary attitude to social and cultural difference). 
 
The concept of territory may also have been embarrassing for some because of its ill-
defined, but powerful associations with the use of similar concepts in animal 
ethology and socio-biology. After all, one of the commonest uses of the term 
‚territory‛ in general discourse is to refer to the home range of a animal, particularly 
with reference to aggressive and defensive behaviours. Of course, anything that risks 
smuggling socio-biological assumptions into studies of human activity is anathema 
to most critical social scientists. A similar mistrust of ideas smacking of 
environmental determinism may have added to the suspicion with which the 
concept of territory has sometimes been regarded. Although many discussions of 
territory suggest that it is fundamentally a political phenomenon, the perception that 
it also often involves fixed borders perhaps raised the spectre of ‚natural 
boundaries‛ and nineteenth century understandings about the relationship between 
culture and environment: desert peoples, mountain peoples, forest peoples and 
plains peoples; each with a special ineffable bond between culture, nature and 
‚territory‛. 
 
The resurgence of territory 
 
The relative neglect of the concept of territory within geography has begun to 
change. It is not hard to find reasons for this. Claims that the world was becoming 
borderless were always overstated, but in the years since 9/11 borders have become 
much more important and more visible. At Heathrow Airport’s new Terminal 5 
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huge signs over passport control announce ‚UK Border‛. Disputes over territory and 
sovereignty are also fiercer as ever. In the summer of 2008 the conflict between 
Russia and Georgia over the disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
erupted into lethal violence. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian land continues. The 
war in Iraq has brought the issue of sovereignty to the fore. In such circumstances 
the abolition of border controls at many international frontiers inside the European 
Union looks more like an exercise in European exceptionalism than the harbinger of 
the cosmopolitan world to which the EU’s supporters might once have aspired. And 
anyway, territorial politics is evident in many places inside the EU in Catalonia, 
Ireland, Belgium and elsewhere. 
 
The recent revival in the apparent political significance of territory poses obvious 
challenges to the ‚borderless world‛ thesis of writers such as Kenichi Ohmae (1990) 
and to claims that we are seeing ‚the end of sovereignty‛ (Camilleri and Falk, 1992), 
though it is worth noting that writers on socio-spatial theory have often provided 
more nuanced accounts. For example, a reduction in the powers of nation-states 
does not necessarily mean the end of territory, as the extensive literature on the 
restructuring and rescaling of state power and political authority amply 
demonstrated (eg Brenner, 2004, Brenner et al., 2003, Jones and MacLeod, 1999, 
Swyngedouw, 2004). In a rather different vein, the ‚new economic geography‛ 
(which, as Ron Martin (1999) shows, took rather different forms in the two 
disciplines of economics and geography) argued for the continuing – or even 
increased – salience of place, locality and region in promoting economic 
development, innovation and ‚competitiveness‛. 
 
The resurgence of territory also appears to call into question the current popularity 
of network approaches to socio-spatial theory – from Manuel Castells’ diagnosis of 
the emergence of the network society based on spaces of flows (Castells, 1996), to 
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geography’s recent emphasis on relational thinking (eg Massey, 2004) and its lively 
engagements with the actor-network theory (eg Bingham and Thrift, 1999). Doubts 
about networks are certainly widespread outside academia, where the assumption 
that human beings are innately and immutably territorial is widely held. Defensive 
nationalisms are presented as ‚natural‛ and predictable expressions of ethnic 
difference. A government minister in a supposedly centre-left administration 
endorses gated communities (The Guardian, 2004). Journalists are quick to diagnose 
regions as suffering from ‚Balkanisation‛, with all that term’s connotations of an 
irredeemably tribal human nature lurking beneath a thin covering of civilisation. 
Respected voices in the European Union, a supposed bastion of tolerance and 
cosmopolitanism, argue against the admission of Turkey because of its unbridgeable 
Otherness (The Independent, 2002). More progressively, a territorial view of the world 
arguably valorises minority languages and cultures, distinctive gastronomies and 
artistic and musical practices, and a nurturing and ecologically-sensitive approach to 
the land and its products. 
 
Networks, on the other hand, have become widely linked to risk and danger in the 
public imagination. IT networks transmit computer viruses and child pornography 
and enable financial fraud on a grand scale. Airlines spread diseases such as SARS 
and swine flu, transport illegal immigrants, and help to destroy the environment 
through climate change. Terrorists, people traffickers and drug smugglers are 
organised in networks. So too (and almost as threatening to middle America and 
middle England) are eco-warriors and anti-capitalist activists. Global financial 
networks have resulted in such a complex web of interconnections that a credit crisis 
in one jurisdiction is rapidly transmitted to many others leading to the failure and 
state bailout of major financial institutions. Despite much evidence for the nomadic 
origins of the human species, nomadism today is frequently seen as unnatural and 
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nomadic people from European Roma to Aboriginal Australians and the San people 
of the Kalahari suffer discrimination, oppression, mistrust and dispossession. 
 
These sketches of the popular politics of territories and networks are over-simplified, 
of course. Opposing views and voices that take a more positive view of networks 
and offer a more sceptical approach to territory are present in all kinds of public and 
private discourse, including in popular journalism and the speeches of populist 
politicians. Nevertheless, the general tendency today is, I think, to affirm a territorial 
view of the world as an expression of human nature and (therefore) right, while 
seeing in networks a source of anxiety, instability, risk and unwelcome change. 
 
Whatever their rights and wrongs, the implicit assumption of almost all these 
discourses – academic, public and popular – is that territory and network are 
incommensurable and competing forms of spatial organisation, and that territory-
thinking and network-thinking are mutually incompatible. In this paper I aim to 
show that this assumption is mistaken and that territory can best be understood as 
the effect of networked relations. The central argument is as follows. The 
phenomenon that we call territory is not an irreducible foundation of state power, let 
alone the expression of a biological imperative. It is not a transhistorical feature of 
human affairs and should not be invoked as an explanatory principle that itself 
needs no explanation: territory is not some kind of spatio-political first cause. 
Instead, territory must be interpreted principally as an effect: as explanandum more 
than explanans. Adapting Bruno Latour, like other enduring and seemingly solid 
features of our world this effect can best be understood as the outcome of networked 
socio-technical practices. Moreover, far from refuting or falsifying network theories 
of spatiality, the contemporary resurgence of territory can be seen as itself a product 
of relational networks. Thus ‚territory‛ and ‚network‛ are not, as is often assumed, 
incommensurable and rival principles of spatial organisation, but are intimately 
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connected. However, these connections need to be identified quite precisely. It is 
important, not to invoke a generalised ‚reciprocity‛, ‚interaction‛ or  ‚dialectic‛ 
between territory and network that leaves the taken-for-granted notion of territory 
intact and simply adds networks on. If we take the networked constitution of the 
territory-effect seriously, then conventional ideas of territory will need to be 
reconceptualised. This in turn might enable us to think somewhat differently about 
the significance and consequences of territory—about the effects of the effect, as it 
were. For example, from this viewpoint territory is necessarily porous, historical, 
mutable, uneven and perishable. It is a laborious work in progress, prone to failure 
and permeated by tension and contradiction. Territory is never complete, but always 
becoming. It is also a promise the state cannot fulfil. 
 
Territory and state spatiality 
 
The concept of territory has been intimately associated with the spatiality of the state 
for at least five hundred years. In political theory, many influential definitions of the 
state have invoked territory as an essential element. Max Weber’s is perhaps the best 
known: 
 
[The state] possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which 
are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims 
binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of 
whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over 
all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory 
organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is 
regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or 
prescribed by it. *…+ The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of 
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force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of 
continuous operation. (Weber, 1968: 56, emphasis added) 
 
For Michael Mann it is the centralised territoriality of the state that explains state 
power (Mann, 1984). For Antony Giddens modern states are distinguished from 
their predecessors by their association with sharply bounded territories across which 
they exercise power uniformly (Giddens, 1985). The modern doctrine of state 
sovereignty in international law is predicated on the concept of territory. Similarly 
the term ‚jurisdiction‛ can refer both to the exercise of legal authority and to the 
territory over which such power extends. In English, the word ‚country‛ can be 
used as a synonym for both ‚state‛ and ‚territory‛. 
 
The notion of territory at work in these formulations involves a number of 
assumptions. Territories are in principle demarcated by clear boundaries rather than 
amorphous frontiers. Territories do not overlap. The spatial extent of state 
sovereignty is coterminous with territory. State power is exercised uniformly across 
territory, and the boundary marks a radical rupture in the nature and intensity of 
power. Such assumptions underpin many of the official doctrines of international 
relations as they have been generally understood by state elites and frequently 
enshrined in international law. These include ‚rights‛ to self-determination, 
territorial integrity, and non-interference (cf. Elden, 2005b); the distinction between 
foreign and domestic policy (cf. Campbell, 1992); control over terrestrial and marine 
resources; and authority over individuals and populations present within state 
boundaries. 
 
While government leaders and international jurists may insist that these conventions 
and doctrines are absolute, they are of course contested politically and frequently 
violated in practice. They also involve significant conceptual difficulties. John 
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Agnew coined the phrase ‚territorial trap‛ (Agnew, 1994) to highlight the mistaken 
assumption that the spatialities of state power and state territory are homomorphic. 
In addition, processes of state restructuring from the 1970s onwards generated more 
complex forms of territorial organisation. James Anderson (1996) suggested that in 
the European Union, neo-medieval and postmodern forms of territoriality were 
emerging involving overlapping authority and shared sovereignty. Examples of 
partition, devolution and federalisation appeared to testify to the plastic nature of 
state spatiality. 
 
This growing awareness of the plasticity of state spatiality is related to the 
emergence of relational approaches to theorising the state more generally. Many 
authors have questioned whether the state should be seen as an distinct entity or a 
unified social actor at all (for a review see Painter, 2005). In a notable critique of the 
relentless reification of the state in mainstream social science, Timothy Mitchell 
argues that the state is not an organisation or structure separate from the rest of 
society, but must be understood as a structural effect, that is ‚it should be examined 
not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that 
make such structures appear to exist‛ (Mitchell, 1991: 94). Mitchell’s arguments form 
an important part of the inspiration for this paper. The suggestion that the state is 
best conceptualised as the effect of practices can equally be applied to state spatiality 
and specifically to territory. Indeed Mitchell himself makes the point that territorial 
boundaries can be understood in exactly this way: 
 
One characteristic of the modern state, for example, is the frontier. By 
establishing a territorial boundary and exercising absolute control over 
movement across it, state practices define and help constitute a national 
entity. Setting up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern 
social practices – continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration 
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laws, inspections, currency control and so on. These mundane arrangements, 
most of them unknown two hundred or even one hundred years ago, help 
manufacture an almost transcendental entity, the nation state. This entity 
comes to seem something much more than the sum of the everyday activities 
that constitute it, appearing as a structure containing and giving order and 
meaning to people's lives. (Mitchell, 1991: 94) 
 
The central thesis of this paper is that territory should be understood principally as 
an effect of just the kind of ‚social practices‛ to which Mitchell refers, though in 
accordance with much current thinking in geography I prefer the term socio-
technical practices. (In fact Mitchell’s reference to barbed-wire fencing makes it clear 
that the material and technical are interwoven with the social in the production of 
territory.) 
 
These practices are the products of networked relations involving both human and 
non-human actors. The geographies of such networks differ in important respects 
from those of the territories (or more precisely the territory-effects) they generate. 
For one, networks may extend very widely across space and time enrolling distant 
people and things in the effectuation of territory. In addition the spatial structure of 
a network may be web-like (multiple, cross-cutting linkages) or more linear (fewer 
relations organised in series), but in either case it is quite different from that of 
territory, which is usually understood to involve a bounded and continuous portion 
of space. 
 
In the second half of the paper I will elaborate these arguments with the help of an 
empirical case study. First, though, I want to examine the treatment of the concept of 
territory in human geography in a little more detail, drawing on both Anglophone 
and Francophone writing. The next section therefore considers two features of that 
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treatment: the way the concept of territory is commonly taken-for-granted and 
unexamined, and the over-extension of the term to refer to a remarkably wide range 
of phenomena. These features suggest there is scope for some re-thinking. Recent 
work by Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault points in a fruitful direction by 
introducing conceptual precision and re-emphasising the irredeemably and actively 
political nature of territory. 
 
The Concept of Territory in Human Geography 
 
A Taken-for-Granted Concept? 
 
The current importance of conflicts over geographical space is reflected in a growing 
academic literature on territory and territorial politics. There are now, for example, 
textbooks on the subject (eg Delaney, 2005, Storey, 2001), and several writers have 
dealt with it as one of the key terms for the study of political geography (Häkli, 2001, 
Newman, 1999a, Newman, 1999b, Paasi, 1999, Paasi, 2003) and global politics (eg 
Elden, 2008). Since John Agnew’s path-breaking paper on the ‚territorial trap‛ 
(Agnew, 1994) the geographical literature on territory has expanded considerably. 
Nevertheless, there is scope for further reflection. Despite growing interest in the 
politics of territory, and the consequences of a territorially ordered and reordered 
world, the idea of territory remains under-theorised. According to Stuart Elden 
‚territory tends to be assumed as unproblematic. Theorists have largely neglected to 
define the term, taking it as obvious and not worthy of further investigation‛ (Elden, 
2005a: 10). While the implications of territory are hotly debated, the concept itself, its 
genealogy, conceptual preconditions and even its precise meaning have been given 
less attention. In writings on the growing importance of territory it is common to 
find either that the word is left undefined and its meaning simply assumed or that a 
single straightforward definition is offered without critique or further discussion. 
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This may not matter for the cogency of the argument of any particular piece of 
writing, but taken together it signifies something of a collective disregard for the 
conceptualisation of this increasingly important idea. 
 
In their introduction to an important collection of essays on War, Citizenship, 
Territory, Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert introduce the concept of territory thus: 
 
‚Territory‛ is a term that is often used interchangeably with land or space, 
but it connotes something more precise. Territory is land or space that has 
had something done to it—it has been acted upon. Territory is land that has 
been identified and claimed by a person or people. *…+ It is a bounded space 
to which there is a compulsion to defend and secure—to claim a particular 
kind of sovereignty—against infringements by others who are perceived to 
not belong. (Cowen and Gilbert, 2008: 16) 
 
This formulation is a fairly typical, and comparable definitions abound. According to 
David Storey, ‚territory refers to a portion of geographic space which is claimed or 
occupied by a person or group of persons or by an institution. It is, thus, an area of 
‚bounded space‛.‛ (Storey, 2001: 1). For David Delaney, a territory is ‚a bounded 
social space that inscribes a certain sort of meaning onto defined segments of the 
material world‛ (Delaney, 2005: 14). In the view of Kevin Cox, territory and 
territoriality are ‚the core concepts of political geography‛ and 
 
territory is to be understood through its relations to those activities we define 
as territorial: the exercise of territoriality, in other words *…+ this means that 
in addition to territory having associations of area and boundary it also has 
ones of defense: territories are spaces which people defend by excluding some 
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activities and by including those which will enhance more precisely what it is 
in the territory that they want to defend. (Cox, 2002: 2-3). 
 
All these definitions are strikingly similar. In terms of rhetoric, they are assertions: 
‚territory is A‛ or ‚territory is B‛. Apart from the opening sentence of the Cowen 
and Gilbert quotation, the reader gets little sense that there may be divergent 
concepts associated with the signifier ‚territory‛. To be fair, the texts from which 
these quotations are taken contain much more extensive discussions of the 
complexities of territory. My point is that it is rare for such discussions to open with 
an explicit acknowledgement that the term is freighted with diverse and perhaps 
competing meanings. 
 
An Over-Extended Concept? 
 
In fact, diverse and competing meanings abound in the ways the word territory has 
been used in practice. According to Michel Lussault the concept has become wildly 
over-extended: 
 
Numerous social sciences (geography, of course, but also anthropology, 
sociology, economics and political science) seek to outdo each other in their 
use of the notion of territory – and its variants,  such as the adjective 
territorial, occasionally nominalised, and the noun territorialisation – most 
often without any real precise, explicit and stable definition. (Lussault, 2007: 
107) 
 
Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones label this tendency ‚methodological 
territorialism, which subsumes all aspects of socio-spatial relations under the rubric 
of territoriality‛ (Jessop et al., 2008: 391). As Anssi Paasi puts it, 
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several important dimensions of social life and social power come together in 
territory: material elements such as land, functional elements like the control 
of space, and symbolic dimensions like social identity. At times the term is 
used more vaguely to refer at various spatial scales to portions of space that 
geographers normally label as region, place or locality. (Paasi, 2003: 109) 
 
The complexities and competing uses of the term have been unpacked by Jacques 
Lévy in his extended entry on territory [territoire] in the Belin Dictionnaire de la 
Géographie (Lévy, 2003b). In fact it is notable that the Dictionnaire devotes 10 pages to 
territoire, comprising entries by three different scholars – Lévy, Bernard Debarbieux 
and Jean-Paul Ferrier. Compare this with the 215 words on territory contributed by 
John Agnew to the 2000 edition of the Blackwell Dictionary of Human Geography. 
Depending on your point of view this difference in weight reflects either the greater 
sophistication or the greater confusion to be found in the Francophone literature and 
debates on territory! (To be fair it should also be noted that the average length of 
entries in the French text is greater than those in the English dictionary.) 
 
Lévy’s entry identifies eight ‚definitions‛ or usages, as follows: 
 
1. During the spatial scientific [moderniste] phase of geography, territory was 
rejected in favour of space [espace+ because of the latter’s more ‚mathematical‛ 
connotations and the assumption that the use of the term territory implied a 
commitment to exceptionalism and the impossibility of comparison. 
2. A synonym for space [espace] – the converse of 1. Here territory is preferred 
precisely because it is assumed to be more grounded in historical reality than 
the more abstract ‚space‛. Levy notes that the two terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the same text. 
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3. A synonym for place [lieu]. A recent usage found in geography, but 
predominantly in political science and economics, where it has replaced ‚the 
local‛ and connotes a certain rootedness and identity that can function as 
resources for development. ‚Territorial‛ is often used in economic geography 
to mean something like local as opposed to global. 
4. An epistemological move to distinguish the real from the concept. ‚Territory‛ 
refers to socialised space itself while ‚geographical space‛ [espace 
géographique] is the intellectual construction that allows it to be thought. 
5. A regulated-bounded space [espace controlé-borné]1. The oldest and for a long 
time the commonest definition, recently revived by the Robert Sack in Human 
Territoriality (1986). The predominant meaning of the term in political science 
and international relations. 
6. An animal metaphor borrowed from ethology and biology. Exclusive control 
is often a result of violence. 
7. An ‚appropriated‛ space [espace «approprié»]. An extension of the previous 
definition. Sometimes used in this sense to refer to the identity component of 
any space. 
8. A historical periodisation. In this usage the history of geography is divided 
into three phases, corresponding to ‚milieu‛, ‚space‛, and ‚territory‛ 
respectively. In this view, territory, with an emphasis on social and individual 
identity is posited as an alternative to ‚geometric Cartesian spatialism‛. 
 
Lévy then goes on to outline a series of critiques of these various usages. Each, he 
suggests, has its advantages, but also its defects. The first four immobilise 
[immobiliser] the term, either by rejecting it, making it take the place of another, or by 
according it an ‚excessively general meaning‛ (Lévy, 2003b: 908). ‚This is also the 
case for definition 7, which seems specific, but which in practice designates all social 
space: what social (which is to say also natural) object is not, in some way, 
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appropriated?‛ (908). The tendency to use ‚territory‛ to refer to portions of space 
that have acquired subjective or symbolic significance is also unhelpful, Lévy 
suggests, since all spaces of interest to human geographers have such characteristics. 
Anglophone geographers’ preference for the term place *lieu] in this context is no 
help, Lévy argues, ‚since it leads to ‚place‛ being translated as ‚territory‛ and vice 
versa, two terms both elementary and fundamental, but which no geographer can 
consider to be synonyms‛ (908). 
 
The idea of periodisation is also given short shrift, which leaves definitions 5 
(‚regulated and bounded space‛) and 6 (ethological). These two definitions, Lévy 
argues, are specific cases of a larger class of spaces comprising all objects defined by 
a continuous or topographical ‚metric‛ [métrique]. The concept of ‚metric‛ or ‚mode 
of measurement and of treatment [traitement] of distance‛ is relatively unfamiliar in 
the contemporary Anglophone geographical literature, perhaps because of its spatial 
scientific connotations. Lévy distinguishes between the two large metrical ‚families‛: 
the topographical, comprising spatially continuous objects, and the topological 
comprising networks and rhizomes. The outcome of this process of critique and 
classification is to define ‚territory‛ as ‚metrical topographical space‛ [espace à 
métrique topographique].  
 
A slightly different spatial typology is developed by Michel Lussault in his recent 
book L’Homme Spatial (Lussault, 2007). Like Lévy, Lussault highlights the confusion 
that surrounds the concept of territory: 
 
A propensity to use territorial vocabulary without defining its boundaries and 
specifying its content, to establish it as a universal descriptor of all humanised 
space, in brief to give in to the magic of the word, is particularly notable since 
the beginning of the 1990s. The problematic character of the this development, 
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let us be clear, resides not in the important diffusion of the term, but in its 
banalisation, that is to say, its propogation in all directions without precise 
and stable content. In many studies, territory too often becomes a screen 
disguising a void. (Lussault, 2007: 107)2 
 
Lussault’s solution is to distinguish three types of social space in contrast to Lévy’s 
two. These are place [lieu], area [aire] and network [réseau]. Place refers to 
‚indivisible space‛. The implication is that places exhibit a socio-spatial coherence 
that would be lost if they were divided. Area, on the other hand, is ‚topographical, 
divisible space‛. An area consists of contiguous space. Networks, Lussault argues, 
involve ‚topological, discontinuous space‛ and represent a space of connection. 
 
Lussault, like Lévy, locates the concept of territory in the topographical category: 
indeed he argues that territory is the ‚ideal-type of area‛. Lussault identifies three 
main usages of the term in contrast to Lévy’s eight. First, he suggests, there is the 
‚common sense‛ usage that defines territory as ‚a simple extension of the terrestrial 
surface, more or less delimited, and supposedly homogeneous‛ (Lussault, 2007: 108). 
Second is the political definition of territory, which has the merit of precision. 
Finally, there is the ethological definition, which is the source, according to Lussault, 
of the terminological over-extension referred to above. 
 
The Political Valorisation of Territory 
 
In different ways, Levy, Lussault and Paasi all highlight the somewhat divergent 
discourses relating to territory in the Anglophone and Francophone literatures. This 
theme has been explored in some detail by Bernard Debarbieux (1999, see also 
Debarbieux, 2003: 41-43). Anglophone usages tend to be ‚harder‛, emphasising 
juridico-political concerns and stressing (often formal) boundedness and 
18 
 
institutionalisation. In French and other romance languages the senses tend to be 
‚softer‛, with terms such as the French territoire and Italian territorio frequently 
connoting ‚region‛ or ‚place‛ (see Lévy’s third definition above). To take a 
mundane example, the University of Ferrara’s Centro Ricerche Urbane, Territoriale e 
Ambientale (CRUTA) becomes the Centre for Urban, Regional and Environmental 
Research (my emphasis) in the University’s English language publications. There 
are, though, exceptions in both cases. In the case of English, the OED recognises a 
politico-juridical definition (‚the land or country belonging to or under the 
dominion of a rule or state‛), an ethological definition from zoology (‚an area 
chosen by an animal or a group of animals and defended against others of the same 
species‛), and this: ‚a tract of land, or district of undefined boundaries; a region‛. So 
much for the taken-for-granted assumption that territories have to have 
boundaries… In addition there are a number of familiar figurative uses of the term 
in English. Conversely, as we have seen from the work of Michel Lussault, there are 
Francophone proponents of the view that territoire can and should be defined 
primarily in political terms (see also Alliès, 1980, Raffestin, 1980). 
 
These complexities and ambiguities reflect (and arguably arise from) the uncertain 
etymology of the term. According to the OED it comes from territoire (French), which 
derived in turn from territorium (Latin) meaning the land around a town. Territorium 
is commonly assumed to be linked to terra (earth) but it may also have arisen from 
terrere, meaning to frighten or terrify which also gave territor (frightener). Territorium 
thus meant ‚a place from which people are warned off‛ (Roby 1876: 363). According 
to the seventeenth century Dutch jurist Grotius, 
 
The origin of the word ‚territory‛ as given by Siculus Flaccus  from 
‚terrifying the enemy‛ (terrendis hostibus) seems not less probable than that of 
Varro  from the word for ploughing (terendo), or of Frontius  from the word 
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for land (terra), or of Pomponius the jurist from ‚the right of terrifying‛ 
(terrendi iure), which is enjoyed by the magistrates. (Grotius, 1964: 667) 
 
The link with fear has a particular contemporary resonance. Sextus Pomponius, cited 
by Grotius, was a second century Roman jurist. His definition of ‚territory‛ is 
reproduced in the Corpus Juris Civilis, the great codification of Roman law 
undertaken for the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century: 
 
The word ‚territory‛ means all the land included within the limits of any city. 
Some authorities hold that it is so called, because the magistrates have a right 
to inspire fear within its boundaries, that is to say, the right to remove the 
people. (Digest, L. xvi. 239.8) 
 
This reveals a legal and political connection (if not a definitive etymological one) 
between ‚territory‛ and fear and exclusion that dates back to one of the earliest 
recorded definitions of the term (Connolly, 1995: xii). The present ‚war on terror‛ 
has led some writers to revive the connection between territory and terror (Anidjar, 
2004: 54-60, Cairo, 2004, Hindess, 2006). 
 
Although etymology can be suggestive, it is not a substitute for conceptual 
clarification. Lussault’s criticism of the over-extension of territory resonates with the 
recent call by Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones for greater precision in the 
use of spatial terminology (Jessop et al., 2008). Having whittled down through 
critique his list of eight uses of territory Jacques Lévy’s settles on a definition that 
includes the ‚regulated-bounded‛ (controlé-bordé) sense of territory, but also admits 
ethological usages. While it may be case that ethologically defined spaces meet 
Lévy’s criterion of being topographical, and that zoologists will continue to refer to 
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them as territories, my view is that to include them within the geographer’s 
definition of territory gives too much ground to socio-biology.  
 
Lussault’s own definition of territory eschews the term’s ethological connotations 
and focuses squarely on the political structuring of space. Territory is a ‚space 
structured by principles of contiguity and continuity‛ which ‚depend less on the 
material aspects of space than on the systems of ideas (systèmes idéels) that frame the 
space in question, as well as the related practices that take place there‛ (Lussault, 
2007: 113). For Lussault, it is the political valorisation of the spatial continuity and 
coherence of a delimited area that defines the specificity of territory vis-à-vis other 
types of space (2007: 113-114). 
 
As Lussault puts it, the dominant ideology at work here invokes the ‚indispensable 
continuum of the ‚territorial fabric‛ («tissu territorial »)‛ (2007: 114). He argues that, 
‚in France, particularly, this is accompanied by a denial of the ‚tearing‛ 
(« déchirure ») [of the fabric] because this would suggest a ‚social fracture‛ (« fracture 
sociale »)‛ (2007: 114). This involves 
 
a powerful territorial representation, used constantly by political actors to 
make the different elements of their space of action ‚hold together‛, to solidly 
link discrete units – places, areas – and thereby to contribute to the 
production of the continuity necessary for the existence of legitimate territory. 
(Lussault, 2007: 114) 
 
‚Political actors‛, says Lussault, ‚are territorial. They seek and valorise spatial 
continuity, whether their territory of reference is local, regional or national‛ (2007: 
113-114). 
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Producing Territory-as-Effect: an English Example 
 
Administrative Regions as Territories 
 
In the remainder of this paper I want to examine how these effects of contiguity, 
continuity and boundedness, are produced and, as Lussault put it, ‚valorised‛. I aim 
to show that the production of ‚territory-as-effect‛ can be understood as the 
outcome of (networked) socio-technical practices. This in turn challenges the 
widespread assumption that territorial and network understandings of space are 
incommensurable. 
 
I will development my argument through a case study of the English administrative 
regions. Excluding the special case of London, which has an elected mayor and 
assembly, there are eight regions in England, each of which is administered by a 
Government Office and a Regional Development Agency whose activities are 
overseen by an appointed Regional Assembly comprising local politicians, business 
people and representatives of the public and voluntary sectors. Like ‚territory‛ the 
word ‚region‛ is freighted with a wide range of contested and sometimes conflicting 
meanings. Not all regions are territories or vice versa. However, the eight English 
regions do constitute territories (or territories in formation) in Lussualt’s sense, that 
is, they are represented as delimited, contiguous and coherence political spaces. 
 
Although England’s regional institutions have a variety of functions and are 
involved in a range of policy domains, one of their most prominent roles is to 
promote economic development. Economic activity is not structured principally in 
terms of territory in Lussault’s sense of the term, bearing in mind that Lussault 
explicitly distances his definition from the over-extended notion of territory common 
in political economy and economic geography. However, the exercise of regional 
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administrative power in the economic field results in the production of territorial 
understandings of economic practices and processes. One such understanding is the 
idea of ‚the regional economy‛. 
 
‚The regional economy‛ is continually invoked in public discourse by political 
actors, officials, experts, journalists, commentators, organisations in civil society, 
business people and even (occasionally) members of the public. I suggest that, in the 
case of the English regions it is one of the most significant elements of the ‚territory-
effect‛. The possibility of conceiving of ‚the regional economy‛ as a focus of policy 
requires the constitution of a spatio-political object with a number of specific 
features, including Lussault’s trio of delimitation, contiguity and coherence. 
Crucially, the world of economic activity, of the production, consumption, 
distribution and exchange of goods and services need not, and usually does not, 
have any of these features. 
 
The space of the regional economy as policy object must be delimited because the 
institutions that act on it have delimited jurisdictions. Thus One NorthEast, the 
regional development agency for north-east England has no powers to intervene in 
the workings of London’s financial services sector, or in the global commodities 
market, even where these have a direct impact on economic activity in its ‚patch‛. 
The space must also be contiguous, first because the regional economy as policy 
object is understood as a functional whole whose parts are joined by material 
linkages that are themselves part of that whole and second because movement 
(whether of goods, people, money, or information) between the parts is assumed 
also to take place within the space of the whole. 
 
Of course there are instances of non-contiguous territories, including enclaves, 
exclaves, and divided states. Examples include Pakistan between 1947 and 1971, 
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west Berlin prior to German reunification, and Gaza and the Palestinian-controlled 
areas of the West Bank. However, these are exceptions that prove the rule, in the 
sense that they are examples of flawed territories for which special arrangements 
have to be made. The case of West Bank, in particular, reveals the near impossibility 
of arranging any kind of effective public administration for a fragmented territory; it 
seems like that this would still be case even if the hostile relationship between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority were resolved. By contrast, the Israeli-controlled areas 
in the Occupied Territories are destined to be contiguous as a result of the 
construction of an elaborate road network that passes over, under or through 
Palestinian areas without being part of them. Portions of territory separated only by 
navigable water are non-contiguous in a less important sense. Examples include the 
French DOM-TOMs, the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Kaliningrad and 
numerous islands. While cases such as these are often a source of political dispute 
and may present practical problems they are not logically (or perhaps we should say 
topologically) non-contiguous provided the possibility of access is maintained. 
 
Finally, the space of the regional economy as policy object must be coherent. All 
economic activity taking place within the space is assumed to form part of the 
regional economy, which is then understood as a totality. That is, the interacting 
parts are thought to constitute a whole that can be treated for policy purposes as a 
unit, albeit one that is heterogeneous and differentiated. 
 
In the case of the English regions, the effects of territorial delimitation, contiguity 
and coherence are generated partly by the socio-technical constitution of the 
‚regional economy‛ as an object of policy. How does this happen? 
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Effectuating Territory Technologically 
 
The short answer is ‚with difficulty‛. Giving effect to territory in this way involves 
the mobilisation of a whole series of governmental technologies and what Andrew 
Barry (2001) has called ‚political machines‛. Barry argues that ‚a distinction can be 
made between a technical device, conceived of as a material or immaterial artefact, 
and a technology,  a concept which refers not just to a device in isolation but also to 
the forms of knowledge, skill, diagrams, charts, calculations and energy which make 
its use possible‛ (2001: 9).  From this perspective, effectuating territory requires 
considerable inputs of labour, expertise and other resources. Moreover, the work 
involved is continuous and repetitive. Delimitation, contiguity and coherence have 
to be constantly reproduced to sustain the effect of territory through time. To take a 
simple example, international border controls are only effective for as long as those 
enforcing them turn up for work each day. Territory doesn’t just happen, it has to be 
worked for. This is not the same as saying that ‚territory is the product of social 
construction‛: ‚to say that a technology can be political is not … to claim that 
technical devices and artefacts are ‚social constructions‛ or are ‚socially shaped‛: for 
the social is not something which exists independently from technology‛ (Barry, 
2001: 9). 
 
What kinds of work and technologies go into the effectuation of territory in the case 
of the English regions? In recent years they have included: 
 
 numerous regional strategies (regional economic strategies, regional spatial 
strategies, integrated regional strategies and many others) 
 policy reviews such as the British government’s 2007 Review of Sub-national 
Economic Development and Regeneration (usually known as the sub-national 
review or SNR) 
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 statistical measures of economic activity and performance at the regional scale 
 a network of regional observatories such as the North East Regional Information 
Partnership (NERIP) 
 international benchmarking studies such as the OECD’s territorial reviews 
 cartographic mapping such as the Ordnance Survey’s ‚points of interest‛  
 modelling and forecasting such as the North East Regional Economic Model 
devised by Durham Business School 
 target-setting and auditing including through public service agreements (PSAs) 
 
I do not have space for a detailed consideration of each of these, so I will take the 
case of target-setting as an example. 
 
Public service agreements (PSAs) were an innovation introduced by the Tony Blair’s 
New Labour government in 1998 shortly after it came to power (Financial Times, 
1998). They were invented by Gordon Brown (then Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(finance minister)) and have been a centrepiece of the government’s attempts to 
reform the public sector. The PSAs are formal agreements between HM Treasury 
(finance ministry) and so-called spending ministries including those responsible for 
health, transport, education, work and pensions, and defence. The agreements set 
out the level of service, investment or activity expected in each area of public service 
and the performance targets that ministries and their related public bodies are 
expected to achieve. Politically, the PSAs are a quintessential New Labour device. 
Their introduction represented a quid pro quo in which the government agreed to 
provide substantial new investment in public services in exchange for assurances 
about improved performance. As such they reflected a nervousness on the part of 
the incoming Blair administration that in the post-Thatcher world the electorate was 
lukewarm about increased public expenditure and needed reassuring that the 
money would feed through into tangible improvements in service provision. They 
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thus sit within a wider neo-liberal discourse that casts the state as, at best, a 
necessary evil, and one that needs to be constantly watched lest it become bloated 
and parasitic. 
  
Since 1998 the PSAs have been regularly revised alongside successive 
comprehensive spending reviews (CSRs) the announcement of new three-yearly 
spending rounds. In the case of regional economic performance Table 1 shows how 
the relevant department’s aims and objectives have been modified following 
successive spending reviews and how the PSA target itself has been worded. 
 
The most recent (2007) revision has seen two notable changes. First, PSA targets are 
now cross-departmental. This change recognises that many of the problems that 
government policies address do not sit neatly within the remit of individual 
government departments. Improving regional economic performance cuts across the 
work of the departments of business, transport, work, and universities and 
innovation as well as the local government department which is the ‚home‛ 
department for regional affairs. Second, there has been a reduction in the number 
and complexity of the PSA targets.  The new PSA target relating to regional 
economic performance is much simpler than earlier versions. It reads: 
 
PSA 7: Improve the economic performance of all English regions and reduce 
the gap in economic growth rates between regions. 
 
Each PSA target has designated indicators intended to allow an assessment of 
whether the target has been met. 
 
For target 7 these are: 
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1. Regional Gross Value Added (GVA) per head growth rates 
2. Regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head levels indexed to the EU15 
average 
3. Regional productivity as measured by GVA per hour worked indices 
4. Regional employment rates 
 
Let’s examine the first of these in a bit more detail. Gross value added (GVA) is a 
measure of economic production. It is defined as the value added in the process of 
production which is equivalent to the value of total output less the value of raw 
materials consumed in the process of production (‚intermediate consumption‛). 
 
Although government economists and accountants treat GVA as a neutral, technical 
accounting measure, it has a complex and contested history and geography. Most 
recently it has spread rapidly through the British public sector. For instance, out of 
163,000 hits in an internet search for ‚gross value added‛ 43,600 were from the 
gov.uk (British government) domain but only 1,860 were from the .gov (US 
government) domain. This is a direct consequence of the imposition of the PSA 
target described above, as is the fact that 47 of the top 100 hits in the search are 
websites of UK local or regional government institutions. Many of these document 
describe GVA as an important indicator of economic performance, without 
explaining that it has become important because of target-setting by central 
government. Thus the agency of the state is disguised and the scope for debate about 
alternative measures (such as those relating to environmental sustainability or to 
health and well-being) is reduced. 
 
The burgeoning literature3 on critical accounting studies provides an alternative 
view of GVA and related concepts. Stuart Burchell, Colin Clubb and Anthony 
Hopwood (1985) have examined the rise of the notion of ‚value added‛ in Britain in 
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the 1970s. They point out that value added became an important policy concept at a 
time of widespread industrial unrest, high inflation and restrictive incomes policies. 
The Labour governments of the time had no wish to endorse the overthrow of 
capitalism, but they also recognised that the vocabulary of profits and profitability in 
discussions of economics risked fuelling discontent in the labour movement with 
government policy and alienating the Labour Party’s core constituency. In that 
context the discourse of value added implied that industrial production was a 
collaborative national effort. In place of a potentially divisive focus on private profit, 
the fruits of economic activity (value added) could be presented as being shared 
between capital in the form of profit and labour in the form of wages. Burchell et al. 
suggest that this means that value added can thus be seen as a conservative concept. 
At the same time it can also resonate with the political left by emphasising the 
legitimacy of worker’s share of output. It also perhaps echoes the Marxian labour 
theory of value. 
 
In 1998 the UK adopted a new set of standards for the production of the national 
accounts. These were in accordance with the 1995 European accounting standards 
(ESA95) which were based in turn on the new 1993 agreed international standards 
for national accounting.4 To mark the introduction of the new standards the British 
government published a set of six A4 format reference volumes including National 
Accounts Concepts, Sources and Methods running to 646 pages. Concepts, Sources and 
Methods provides a detailed description of how the national accounts are compiled, 
which is in itself a dramatic illustration of the extraordinary labour that goes into the 
calculation and monitoring of national economic activity, and of the thoroughly 
artefactual, even fictive character of the national accounts. 
 
Concepts, Sources and Methods identifies the production account (defined as ‚Account 
I‛ in ESZ95) as the core of any set of national accounts ‚as it records the activity of 
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producing goods and services‛ (Office for National Statistics, 1998: 59). The 
production account records the total value of goods and services produced (output) 
and the total value of raw materials used up in the production process (intermediate 
consumption). The difference between the two, which is the balancing item on the 
production account, is gross value added. Thus an interesting feature of gross value 
added is cannot be measured directly, but as a balancing item it is instead inferred 
(GVA = output less intermediate consumption). Net value added can be calculated 
by also deducting an allowance for capital depreciation. 
 
According to Concepts, Sources and Methods, ‚gross value added is a measure of the 
contribution to GDP made by an individual producer, industry or sector, and 
primary incomes are paid out of it; so it is carried forward into the distribution of 
income accounts‛ (Office for National Statistics, 1998: 5). Among other things, the 
distribution of income accounts, show how GVA is ‚distributed to institutional units 
with claims on the value added created by production. This shows income from 
employment (wages and salaries, employer contributions to pension schemes), 
operating surplus (profit) and mixed income (mostly self-employment income)‛ 
(Office for National Statistics, 1998: 5). The use of the word ‚claims‛ here is notable, 
though the public accounting standards unsurprisingly do not discuss the power 
relations that underlie claims-making or the political processes through which 
differential claims are made effective. 
 
The distribution accounts allow alternative ways of calculating GVA to be identified. 
Since all GVA is distributed, the total amount of GVA can be calculated by adding 
together employee compensation (wages, salaries and employer pension 
compensation), profits and the proceeds of self-employment. Similarly, since wages 
and profits are either spent on final consumption or saved GVA in given period 
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must also be equal to the sum of expenditure and saving. Quantitatively, therefore, 
the following are all equal to GVA: 
 
 output less intermediate consumption 
 wages plus profits 
 expenditure plus savings 
 
In principle, these arithmetic equalities allow GVA to be calculated not just for the 
national economy as a whole, but also for component elements such as individual 
organisations, sectors and regions. For example, for a non-profit-making 
organisation, such as a university or a public hospital, GVA is equal to wages (plus 
operating surplus, if any). The concept of GVA is therefore agnostic about whether 
value is added by the private, public or voluntary sector and might be seen as 
running counter to neo-liberal assertions that the private sector is the only 
productive part of the economy. 
 
Each mode of calculation should produce the same quantitative results, but in each 
case the presence of GVA is being derived from other variables. It is in the peculiar 
nature of commodities that it is not possible to look at a finished product, such as a 
car or a table, and work out directly what proportion of its value was produced by 
whom. As Marx put it in Capital, ‚the use-values coat and linen are combinations of, 
on the one hand, productive activity with a definite purpose, and, on the other, cloth 
and yarn; the values coat and linen, however, are merely congealed quantities of 
homogeneous labour‛ (Marx, 1867/1976: 135-136 emphasis added). GVA itself is 
unobservable, virtual: a kind of ghostly presence, which becomes more spectral still 
when we examine how it is computed in practice at the regional scale. 
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The UK government does not produce a full set of public accounts at the regional 
level (Office for National Statistics, 1998: 13) and Concepts, Sources and Methods does 
not detail how regional GVA should be calculated. Instead, the Office for National 
Statistics has published a separate guide to the methodology for the compilation of 
regional accounts and the calculation of regional GVA (Office for National Statistics, 
undated). Regional GVA is calculated using the income approach (GVA = wages plus 
profits). Moreover, ‚a ‚top-down‛ approach is used to calculate regional figures, 
whereby the national aggregate is allocated to regions using the most appropriate 
measure of regional activity, or regional indicator, available‛ (Office for National 
Statistics, undated: 5). The annual calculation of regional GVA is a legal European 
Union requirement and informs EU funding decisions. Regional GVA must be 
broken down by industrial sector (industry group) and disaggregated to sub-
regional levels (NUTS2 and NUTS3). 
 
The choice of the income-based, rather than production-based, mode of calculation 
was a pragmatic one determined by the available data sources. The top-down 
approach involves apportioning a share of the various income components of 
national GVA to each region based on information from a variety of data sources. 
Some of these are survey-based, such as the Annual Business Inquiry survey, the 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, and the Labour Force Survey. Others are 
what is described as ‚administrative data sources‛ such as information collected 
through the processing of tax and national insurance payments. Although not 
explicitly stated in the published methodology, the partial reliance on data from 
sample surveys means that figures for regional GVA must be considered to be 
estimates, and subject to sampling error. At the NUTS1 (regional) level, GVA is 
calculated on both a residence and a workplace basis. Where net inter-regional 
commuting is an important factor (principally in south-east England) the two 
methods may produce significantly different figures. The workplace-based figure 
32 
 
reflects the actual location of production and is required under the European 
accounting standard ESA95. 
 
Profits (approximately 20% of the total)  present practical problems. Although not 
much detail is given, the Regional Accounts Methodology Guide states that profits of 
corporations are allocated partly in proportion to employee earnings. On the face of 
it this seems to assume that the ratio between wages and profits is constant between 
regions. There are also conceptual problems here. In what sense do profits have a 
regional location? In the terms used by the Concepts, Sources and Methods volume, 
they represent a ‚claim‛ on GVA by proprietors or shareholders. These may be 
individuals who reside and/or raise capital outside the region, or they may be 
national or international institutions who have no regional ‚home‛. For the 
Northern Rock bank was regarded as a mainstay of the economy of north-east 
England. It is headquartered in Newcastle, but its shares are traded on the London 
stock exchange and could have been bought by anyone looking to invest capital 
denominated in sterling. When Northern Rock was profitable in what sense did its 
profits ‚belong‛ to the north-east region? Are its more recent losses really the north-
east’s losses?  These kinds of questions go to the heart of the issue of territory. They 
problematise the very idea of a regional economy as a bounded space and highlight 
its artefactual character. 
 
Commentaries on the usefulness of GVA have included some notable criticisms. 
According to a report from the Institute of Public Policy Research, for example, 
 
GVA has limitations in that it includes only goods and services sold in the 
market sector of the economy, or goods not sold on the market whose value is 
imputed by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for the purpose of 
compiling the statistics (for example, many public services such as health and 
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state education). It misses out household production and includes no measure 
for many of the things that people value in life – the environment, community 
cohesion, relationships with friends and family, arts and culture, and so on. 
Hence it is a highly imperfect measure of the ‚well-being‛ of the North. 
(Johnson et al., 2007: 9-10) 
 
The authors go on to claim that ‚nonetheless, GVA is readily measurable to an 
internationally agreed standard‛ (Johnson et al., 2007: 10) which is questionable 
given the labour intensive nature of the process involved that has been highlighted 
above, and the potentially uncertain accuracy of the resulting estimates. 
 
An overreliance on GVA as the key measure of economic performance was also 
called into question by a Parliamentary committee in 2003: 
 
We also received evidence that the current indicator proposed for the 
measurement of performance against this target, regional Gross Value Added 
per head, is not fit for purpose and recommend instead the use of a basket of 
measures including productivity, employment and unemployment rates, 
household income and quality of life. (House of Commons ODPM Select 
Committee, 2003: 3) 
 
As we have seen above, some of these additional indicators have been included in 
the latest PSA, although not those relating to household income and quality of life. 
 
Despite these criticism, GVA remains the principal measure of regional economic 
performance. It is, though, only one of dozens of governmental technologies that 
together define and bring into being a political object, ‚the regional economy‛, 
which in turn contributes to the effectuation of region-as-territory. Through the 
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action of these technologies, the effects of delimitation, contiguity and coherence that 
allow regions to be understood as territories are generated by, for example, the 
apportionment of otherwise nomad flows of energy (including labour power), 
matter, money and information to one geographical area or another. These flows are 
thus, in a sense, subject to territorial coding. However three immediate caveats to 
this suggestion need to be entered. 
 
First, flows are coded for (or to) a territory rather than by territory. Territory is an 
effect of such coding: it does not itself function as an actor, a political subject, or a 
governmental technology. According to Andrew Barry (2001: 3), ‚government 
operates not just in relation to spaces defined and demarcated by geographical or 
territorial boundaries but in relation to zones formed through the circulation of 
technical practices and devices.‛ But I want to go further and suggest that 
geographical and territorial boundaries are themselves also formed by ‚technical 
practices and devices‛ – boundaries (delimitations) are not outside technology and 
do not pre-exist it. Second, the territorial coding of flows, whether retrospective in 
the case of accounting and auditing technologies or prospective in the case of 
forecasting and modelling technologies, is not the same as capture which involves 
the material binding of that-which-is-flowing in specific assemblages. Thirdly, 
neither coding nor capture are permanent. Accumulation may be a defining feature 
of capitalism but GVA, for example, does not accumulate endlessly ‚in‛ a particular 
territory. Output is exported or consumed, wages are (mostly) spent, and profits are 
off-shored, consumed, or invested, often elsewhere. To be sure, patterns of uneven 
economic development may persist for long periods, but they are more like the 
peaks and troughs of atmospheric pressure on a meteorological chart, constituted by 
constant flux, than they are like the more static contours on a topographical land 
map. 
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Conclusion 
 
This perspective suggests that the territory-effect is the product of networked socio-
technical processes in two senses. First, the governmental technologies that produce 
the effect of territory are the product of spatially extensive networks of human and 
non-human actors. In the case of my GVA example, the calculation of regional GVA 
requires the interaction of a host of heterogeneous people and things. These include 
the internationally agreed System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93), itself the 
product of a collaboration between the United Nations, the European Commission, 
the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the World Bank. SNA93 provided the framework for the 
European accounting standard ESA95, which in turn drove the production of the 
new UK national accounts. The mobilisation of these accounting frameworks to 
produce figures for regional GVA requires the collation of data from diverse sources, 
including surveys, taxation returns and employment records. It involves the 
acquisition, maintenance and use of computer hardware and software for storage 
and processing. It makes use of models, maps, and locational data as postcode 
records. It requires hundreds of hours of work by accountants, econometricians, IT 
professionals, statisticians, clerks and technical writers, all of whom have to be 
trained, recruited and managed. Transforming the calculations into information that 
can be accessed and used by non-specialists involves web-designers, publishers, 
researchers and journalists. The use of this information to make judgements about 
whether targets have been met involves civil servants and politicians. And all this 
activity depends on material infrastructures of data networks, routers, filing 
systems, disks, air conditioning systems, stable electrical supplies and so on and on. 
Most of such heterogeneous networks extend geographically well beyond the 
confines of any individual regional, or even national territory. 
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Second, the matter, energy, information and money that technologies such as 
regional GVA code to one regional territory or another are themselves both the 
products of and mobilised by socio-technical networks. It has been fashionable in 
recent years to ascribe regional economic growth to endogenous factors, such as 
territorially specific stocks of tangible and particularly intangible assets. But most 
assets are themselves heterogeneous networked phenomena, and when they are 
examined closely it is difficult to determine which are endogenous and which are 
not. Take workforce skills and knowledge, one of the principal categories of 
intangible assets. Professional skills and knowledge typically depend on extensive 
national and international networks of education, training, assessment, continuing 
professional development, regulation and exchange. And craft skills, which are often 
thought of as more locally rooted, are also increasingly trans-territorial. Today, after 
all, even winemaking, that apparently most soil-bound of all crafts, is subject to 
extensive inter-regional and international transfers of knowledge, information, 
technology and capital. 
 
So the territory-effect is generated by and depends on networked relations. This 
conclusion runs counter to the widespread view in geography that ‚territory‛ and 
‚network‛ are incommensurable forms of spatial organisation. For example, Manuel 
Castells, writing of the contrast between the space of places and the space of flows, 
refers to ‚a structural schizophrenia between two spatial logics‛ (Castells, 1996: 428). 
Both Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault draws a similarly sharp distinction between 
the topographical metric associated with territory and the topological metric 
associated with rhizomes and networks (Lévy, 2003a: 608, Lussault, 2007: 131). 
 
In Les Territoires du Risque, Valérie November posed the question of whether ‚the 
notions of network and territory can be articulated together or whether they 
correspond to two different explanatory orders‛ (November, 2002: 273).5 The 
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evidence of the spatial effects produced by governmental technologies such as GVA 
suggests that network and territory can be articulated together – indeed they always 
are. But the relationship is not symmetrical. Territory is not the timeless and solid 
geographical foundation of state power it sometimes seems, but a porous, 
provisional, labour intensive and ultimately perishable and non-material product of 
networked socio-technical practices. To return to Timothy Mitchell’s suggestion that 
the state ‚should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, 
metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist‛ (1991: 94), 
it seems perhaps appropriate to conclude that territory should be examined not as an 
actual state space, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make 
such spaces appear to exist. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented in the New State Spatialities session organised 
by John Harrison and Julie MacLeavy at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Association of 
American Geographers in Boston and at seminars at Durham University and the Open 
University. I am very grateful for the feedback received at those events, particularly from 
John Paul Jones III and Keith Woodward at the Durham seminar and from John Allen, Allan 
Cochrane and Jennifer Robinson at the OU. I have also benefited greatly from suggestions 
from Angharad Closs Stephens, Stuart Elden and two anonymous referees. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
 
References 
Agnew, J (1994) The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international 
relations theory. Review of International Political Economy 1: 53-80 
Alliès, P (1980) L'invention du territoire. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble 
Anderson, J (1996) The shifting stage of politics: new medieval and postmodern 
territorialities? Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 14: 133-153 
38 
 
Anidjar, G (2004) Terror right. CR: The New Centennial Review 4: 35-69 
Barry, A (2001) Political machines: governing a technological society. London: Athlone 
Bingham, N and Thrift, N (1999) Some new instructions for travellers: the geography 
of Bruno Latour and Michel Serres. In Crang, M and Thrift, N (eds) Thinking 
space. (pp 281-301). London: Routledge 
Brenner, N (2004) New state spaces: urban governance and the rescaling of statehood. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Brenner, N, Jessop, B, Jones, M and MacLeod, G (eds.) (2003) State/space: a reader, 
Oxford: Blackwell 
Burchell, S, Clubb, C and Hopwood, AG (1985) Accounting in its social context: 
towards a history of value added in the United Kingdom. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 10: 381-413 
Cairo, H (2004) The Field of Mars: heterotopias of territory and war. Political 
Geography 23: 1009-1036 
Camilleri, J and Falk, J (1992) The end of sovereignty? Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
Campbell, D (1992) Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of 
identity. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 
Castells, M (1996) The information age: economy, society and culture.  Vol 1. The rise of the 
network society. Oxford: Blackwell 
Connolly, W (1995) The ethos of pluralization. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press 
Cowen, D and Gilbert, E (2008) The politics of war, citizenship, territory. In Cowen, 
D and Gilbert, E (eds) War, citizenship, territory. (pp 1-30). London: Routledge 
Cox, K (2002) Political geography: territory, state, and society. Oxford: Blackwell 
Debarbieux, B (1999) Le territoire: histoires en deux langues. A bilingual (his-)story 
of territory. In Chivallon, C, Ragouet, P and Samers, M (eds) Discours 
scientifique et contextes culturels. Géographies françaises à l'épreuve post-moderne. 
(pp 33-46). Bourdeaux: Maison de Sciences de l'Homme d'Aquitaine 
39 
 
Debarbieux, B (2003) Le territoire en géographie et en géographie grenobloise. In De 
Bernardy, M and Debarbieux, B (eds) Le territoire en sciences sociales: approches 
disciplinaires et pratiques de laboratoires. (pp 35-51). Grenoble: Maison de 
Sciences de l'Homme - Alpes 
Delaney, D (2005) Territory: a short introduction. Oxford: Blackwell 
Elden, S (2005a) Missing the point: globalization, deterritorialization and the space of 
the world. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30: 8-19 
Elden, S (2005b) Territorial integrity and the war on terror. Environment and Planning 
A 37: 2083-2104 
Elden, S (2008) Why is the world divided territorially? In Edkins, J and Zehfuss, M 
(eds) Global politics: a new introduction. (pp 192-219). London: Routledge 
Financial Times (1998) Treasury heralds revolution in public services. 18 December 
Giddens, A (1985) The nation-state and violence. Cambridge: Polity 
Grotius, H (1964) The law of war and peace. (Volume two: the translation.). New York, 
NY: Oceana Publications Inc. 
Häkli, J (2001) In the territory of knowledge: state-centred discourses and the 
construction of society. Progress in Human Geography 25: 403-422 
Hindess, B (2006) Terrortory. Alternatives 31: 243-257 
House of Commons ODPM Select Committee (2003) Reducing regional disparities in 
prosperity. London: HMSO 
Jessop, B, Brenner, N and Jones, M (2008) Theorizing sociospatial relations. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26: 389-401 
Johnson, M, Mrinska, O and Reed, H (2007) The North in numbers: a strategic order of 
the northern English economies. Newcastle upon Tyne: IPPR North 
Jones, MR and MacLeod, G (1999) Towards a regional renaissance? Reconfiguring 
and rescaling England's economic governance. Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 24: 295-313 
40 
 
Lévy, J (2003a) Métrique. In Lévy, J and Lussault, M (eds) Dictionnaire de la géographie 
et de l'espace des sociétés. (pp 607-609). Paris: Belin 
Lévy, J (2003b) Territoire. In Lévy, J and Lussault, M (eds) Dictionnaire de la 
géographie et de l'espace des sociétés. (pp 907-910). Paris: Belin 
Lussault, M (2007) L'homme spatial: la construction sociale de l'espace humain. Paris: 
Seuil 
Mann, M (1984) The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and 
results. Archives Européennes de Sociologie 25: 185-213 
Martin, R (1999) The new "geographical turn" in economics: some critical reflections. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 23: 65-91 
Marx, K (1867/1976) Capital, volume 1. London: Penguin Books 
Massey, D (2004) Geographies of responsibility. Geografiska Annaler 86B: 5-18 
Mitchell, T (1991) The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics. 
American Political Science Review 85: 77-96 
Newman, D (ed.) (1999a) Boundaries, territory and postmodernity, London: Frank Cass 
Newman, D (1999b) Geopolitics renaissant: territory, sovereignty and the world 
political map. In Newman, D (ed) Boundaries, territory and postmodernity. (pp 1-
16). London: Frank Cass 
November, V (2002) Les territoires du risque: le risque comme objet de réflexion géographie. 
Berne: Peter Lang 
Office for National Statistics (1998) United Kingdom national accounts: concepts, sources 
and methods. London: The Stationery Office 
Office for National Statistics (undated) Regional accounts methodology guide. London: 
Office for National Statistics 
Ohmae, K (1990) The borderless world: power and strategy in the interlinked economy. 
London: HarperCollins 
41 
 
Paasi, A (1999) Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in a world of flows. In 
Newman, D (ed) Boundaries, territory and postmodernity. (pp 69-88). London: 
Frank Cass 
Paasi, A (2003) Territory. In Agnew, J, Mitchell, K and Toal, G (eds) A companion to 
political geography. (pp 109-122). Oxford: Blackwell 
Painter, J (2005) State:society. In Cloke, P and Johnston, R (eds) Spaces of geographical 
thought: deconstructing human geography's binaries. (pp 42-60). London: Sage 
Raffestin, C (1980) Pour une géographie du pouvoir. Paris: Litec 
Sack, RD (1986) Human territoriality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Storey, D (2001) Territory: the claiming of space. Harlow: Prentice Hall 
Swyngedouw, E (2004) Globalisation or 'glocalisation'? Networks, territories and 
rescaling. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17: 25-48 
The Guardian (2004) Blunkett calls for spread of gated communities. 22 January 
The Independent (2002) Giscard predicts 'end of EU' if Turkey joins. 9 November 
Weber, M (1968) Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology. New York, 
NY: Bedminster Press 
 
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 The French word ‘contrôlé’ usually means ‘checked’, ‘supervised’, or ‘examined’ 
rather than ‘controlled’ in the English sense of ‘governed’ or ‘directed’, which makes 
a precise translation of Lévy’s term difficult. ‘Regulated’ is not a precise translation, 
but seems to capture the meaning better than ‘controlled’. It is not intended as a 
reference to regulation theory! 
2 ‘Une propension à user du vocabulaire territorial sans en circonscrire le contour et 
préciser le contenu, à le dresser en descripteur universel de tout espace humanisé, 
bref à céder à la magie de ce vocable, est particulièrement notable depuis le début 
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des années 1990. Le caractère problématique de cette évolution, entendons-nous 
bien, ne réside pas dans la diffusion importante du terme, mais dans sa banalisation, 
c’est-à-dire sa propagation tous azimuts sans contenu stable précis. Le territoire dans 
nombre d’études devint trop souvent un écran dissimulant un vide.’ 
3 See for example the journals Accounting, Organizations and Society, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting and the work of Peter Miller and Anthony Hopwood, 
among others. 
4 Much could be said about the impulse for standardisation involved in these 
developments. 
5 ‘Si les notions de réseau et de territoire peuvent s’articuler entre elles ou si elles 
correspondent à deux ordres explicatifs différents.’ 
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Table 1: The evolution of PSA targets relating to regional economic performance 1998-2004 
Spending 
Review 
Spending 
Round 
Lead 
Department 
Departmental Aim Relevant Department 
Objective 
Relevant PSA Target 
1998 CSR 1999-2002 N/a N/a N/a None. 
2000 CSR 2001-2004 Department of 
Environment, 
Transport and 
the Regions 
To improve everyone's quality of life, 
now and for the future, through: 
thriving prosperous regions and 
communities; better transport; better 
housing; a better environment; safer, 
healthier surroundings; and prudent 
use of natural resources. 
Objective VIII: enhance 
sustainable economic 
development and social 
cohesion throughout England 
through effective regional 
action and integrated local 
regeneration programmes. 
17. Improve the economic performance 
of all regions, measured by the trend in 
growth of each region's GDP per capita. 
Joint target with DTI. 
SR 2002 2003-2006 Office of the 
Deputy Prime 
Minister 
Thriving, inclusive and sustainable 
communities in all regions. 
Objective I: work with the full 
range of Government 
Departments and policies to 
raise the levels of social 
inclusion, neighbourhood 
renewal and regional 
prosperity. 
PSA Target 2. Make sustainable 
improvements in the economic 
performance of all English regions and 
over the long term reduce the persistent 
gap in growth rates between the regions, 
defining measures to improve 
performance and reporting progress 
against these measures by 2006. (Joint 
target with HM Treasury and DTI.) 
SR 2004 2005-2008 Office of the 
Deputy Prime 
Minister 
Creating sustainable communities. Objective II: Promoting the 
development of the English 
regions by improving their 
economic performance so 
that all are able to reach their 
full potential, and developing 
an effective framework for 
regional governance taking 
account of the public’s view 
of what’s best for their area. 
PSA Target 2. Make sustainable 
improvements in the economic 
performance of all English regions by 
2008, and over the long term reduce the 
persistent gap in growth rates between 
the regions, demonstrating progress by 
2006, joint with the Department of Trade 
and Industry and HM Treasury, including 
by establishing Elected Regional 
Assemblies in regions which vote in a 
referendum to have one. 
Source: HM Treasury spending reviews, 1998-2004 
